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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 05-4348
            
JOLANTA KRZYWOSZYJA
O/B/O
ANNA KRZYWOSZYJA,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
          
APPEAL FROM THE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
D.C. Civil No. 03-cv-00119
District Judge:  The Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh
         
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 28, 2006
Before: BARRY, VAN ANTWERPEN, and SILER*, Circuit Judges.
(Filed August 8, 2006)
____
        OPINION OF THE COURT
         
______________
*The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr., Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
2SILER, Circuit Judge
Jolanta Krzywoszyja (“Jolanta”), the surviving daughter of Anna Krzywoszyja
(“Anna”), deceased, seeks review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
(“Commissioner”) denying Anna’s application for disability insurance benefits.  Anna
alleged disability due to high blood pressure, headaches and general pain post-surgery.  The
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) ruled that Anna was not disabled prior to or on the last day
of her disability insurance, December 31, 1988, within the meaning of the Act and thus
denied her benefits.  The district court affirmed.  Because substantial evidence supported the
ALJ’s finding, we also affirm.      
I.
From 1965 on, Anna repaired, cleaned and serviced watches, an occupation requiring
very little physical exertion.  She alleged that she became disabled in 1982 due to right kidney
damage, sustained while undergoing a total abdominal hysterectomy.  After her surgery, she
often complained of pain in the right side of her back and legs and lightheadedness.  She had
to lie down daily due to intense headaches.  Also after the surgery, Anna’s blood pressure was
“sky high,” and her legs and ankles were swollen which imposed difficulty for standing or
walking long distances.  Anna took over-the-counter medications (such as Excedrin) for
headaches and Inderal for high blood pressure.  In 1991, Anna collapsed and, while she was
in the hospital, doctors discovered a tumor in her left kidney and that her urethra had been
3sliced.  She subsequently underwent dialysis, had a kidney transplant and eventually died in
August 1994.
In evaluating Anna’s claim for disability benefits, the ALJ stated that notes recorded
during Anna’s post-operative doctor visits revealed that she was doing well and that her
incision was well-healed.  Based on these physician’s notes and the claimant’s own
descriptions of her medical condition, the ALJ concluded that the record did not document
any condition or complication that could be associated with the surgery performed in 1982.
He accordingly concluded that Jolanta’s testimony was not corroborated by either the
objective evidence or the evidence of record.  Because Anna was not impaired to an extent
that significantly limited her ability to perform basic work-related activities, she did not have
a severe impairment as required for a finding of disability.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1521.      
II.  
The reviewing court does not engage in fact finding, so “the findings of the
Commissioner [] as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . .
.”  42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  There must be medical evidence to disprove a claimant’s testimony
as to pain.  Green v. Schweiker, 749 F.2d 1066, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984).  An ALJ must make
specific findings when evaluating a claimant’s subjective pain.  Hargenrader v. Califano, 575
F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1978).
III.
4 The Social Security Act defines disability as an “inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971).  Furthermore,
An individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical
or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only
unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and
work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which
exists in the national economy. . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). 
Pursuant to the regulations, the ALJ engages in a five-step sequential analysis when
evaluating whether a claimant is disabled.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).  The claimant bears
the burden of proof on steps one through four; if the claimant establishes her disability
according to the first four factors, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate
that the claimant is capable of performing other work in the national economy in view of her
age, education and work experience.  Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 315-16 (3d Cir. 2000).
In the present case, the ALJ engaged in the five-step sequential analysis, but concluded
that the claimant did not establish a severe impairment as required by step two.  The ALJ
considered claimant’s allegations of pain but was not able to validate those allegations with
treatment notes and no symptoms were diagnosed as resulting complications from the
hysterectomy surgery.  
Although the ALJ must consider subjective evidence of pain and combination of
impairments, the final conclusion must be based on specific factual findings in the record.
5Green, 749 F.2d at 1071 (“There must be objective medical evidence of some condition that
could reasonably produce pain.”).  Subjective symptoms of pain can be validated if observed
and treated over time by a physician.  Dorf v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 896, 902 (3d Cir. 1986).
Although Jolanta testified that Anna did not return to her work after surgery in 1982,
she failed to show that Anna was not able to return to work.  Anna’s medical records
contradict Jolanta’s claims because they show that Anna was discharged in good condition.
Jolanta also claims that Anna’s blood pressure was “sky high,” a claim which directly
contradicts Dr. Sheflin’s, Anna’s treating physician’s, notes indicating that Anna’s blood
pressure was stable post-operatively and was never excessively elevated throughout his time
as Anna’s physician.  Dr. Sheflin noted that Anna was “doing well” and she took over-the-
counter pain relievers for her headaches.  The ALJ noted “that although Jolanta’s testimony
chronologically detailed the reasons for her mother’s inability to work during the period in
question, her testimony is not corroborated by other evidence of record.  Such a result is
consistent with Green, 749 F.2d at 1070.  
The ALJ offered the following reasons for rejecting Jolanta’s testimony with proper
citations to the record:  
The record shows that in May 1981, eighteen months prior to the surgery, the
claimant’s blood pressure was elevated.  On March 30, 1983, the claimant was
placed on Inderal, a medication used to treat both hypertension and migraine-
type headaches.  While the record does not specify what this medication was
used for, two months later, on May 3, 1983, her blood pressure was under
control, and remained so for the remainder of the period under consideration.
*     *     *
6The claimant alleges that she was well until she had the surgery on November
9, 1982.  The record repeatedly shows that the claimant did well post-
operatively.  By November 29, 1982, Dr. Sheflin noted that her incision was
healed and on December 6, 1982, he noted that the claimant was “doing well
post-op[eratively] and her [vaginal] cuff was also “well healed.”  On December
27, 1982, her incision was “well healed.”
Thereafter, the claimant complained of hot flashes and was placed on hormone
replacement therapy.  On January 3, 1983, Dr. Sheflin noted that the claimant
was “improving only slowly”.  She was noted to have hemorrhoids and was
treated [for] . . . this condition.  On January 31, 1983, two and a half months
after surgery, Dr. Sheflin again noted that the claimant was “doing well” . . . .
On May 23, 1983 he noted that she was “much improved.”  On June 6, 1983
office notes indicate that the claimant was “doing well;” her blood pressure was
normal and she wanted to discontinue medication for the headaches.
The ALJ cited to Anna’s medical records when he determined that claimant’s
allegations were unfounded because Anna’s incision was “well healed,” her blood pressure
was stable at all times after surgery and her alleged intensive headaches did not impair her and
were improved by over-the-counter drugs.  There were other symptoms that the ALJ
considered but the regulation prevents a finding of severe impairment absent a previous
medical diagnosis that could reasonably produce such symptoms.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c).
Anna never returned to work.  At step two, the impairment is severe if it limits the
person’s ability to do basic work activities; an impairment is not severe if it is a slight
abnormality that has only a minimal effect on the claimant’s ability to do basic work
activities.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1521; Soc. Sec. Ruling (“SSR”) 85-28; Ferguson v. Schweiker,
765 F.2d 31, 33 n.2 (3d Cir. 1985).  Prior to the last date she was insured for disability
insurance, Anna complained of moodiness, tinnitus, hives, swelling of legs and varicosities.
7The record, however, failed to indicate Anna’s doctors ever diagnosed her with an impairment
that was likely to cause any of the symptoms she alleged.  There was no medical evidence of
any significant kidney disease prior to 1991.  Finally, Dr. Sheflin did not diagnose Anna with
any impairments of a debilitating nature from any time after her surgery until December 1988.
  
There are no medical records indicating that the slicing of Anna’s right urethra caused
her kidney disease.  Records indicate that Anna’s kidney tumor, dialysis and eventual kidney
failure caused her death but none of it related back to her urethra.  The finding of the sliced
urethra was part of the examination process, not part of the diagnosis.  SSR 83-20 requires an
ALJ to call a medical expert only when a patient’s medical records lead to an ambiguous onset
date.  There are no medical records indicating any symptoms of claimant’s kidney disease
until 1991. 
Since the records did not indicate a diagnosis of any impairments that cause the alleged
symptoms, the ALJ found that claimant failed her burden of proof and therefore denied her
benefits.  There is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s decision.
Jolanta insists that the Commissioner twice lost claimant’s records and that this should
be weighed heavily against the Commissioner’s findings.  The record on appeal does contain
a note that indicated one of claimant’s physicians, Dr. Panotes, had lost her records due to a
flood.  Anna saw Dr. Panotes beginning in 1982; unfortunately, Dr. Panotes could only
produce notes taken from 1988.  Counsel offers no reason why the ALJ could not rely on Dr.
Sheflin’s treatment notes for the same period.  If medical evidence in the record does not
8refute the treating physician’s opinion, the ALJ is bound by it.  Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37,
42 (3d Cir. 1989).  The ALJ properly relied on Dr. Sheflin’s treatment notes and other
evidence in the record because no other evidence presented by the claimant refutes Dr.
Sheflin’s opinion.  
Affirmed.
